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ABSTRACT
Many instances of parental enhancement are
objectionable on egalitarian grounds because they
unnecessarily amplify one kind of asymmetry of power
between parents and children. Because children have full
moral status, we ought to seek egalitarian relationships
with them. Such relationships are compatible with
asymmetries of power only to the extent to which the
asymmetry is necessary for (1) advancing the child’s level
of advantage up to what justice requires or (2) instilling
in the child morally required features. This is a ground to
oppose parental enhancements whose purpose is either
to merely satisfy parents’ preferences or to confer on the
child advantages above and beyond what the child is
owed by justice.
It has always been like that: as a birth parent you
could not choose your child but had to put up with
whatever chance had dealt you. And, I shall argue,
there is something desirable about this fact.
Children, too, are unable to choose their parents,
and this will not change. By contrast, with the help
of technology, parents are able to increasingly
determine features of their future biological chil-
dren and, in this way, gain some control over
whom they parent. I call this ‘parental genetic
shaping’ to distinguish it from other kinds of
shaping that parents do—for instance, through edu-
cation or through the choice of various conditions
in which their children grow up. My focus here is
on one type of parental shaping, namely parental
choices to use technology to determine, or increase
the likelihood of, particular features of their
already existing embryos. Call this ‘parental
enhancement’ to distinguish it from parental deci-
sions to implant embryos based on their (higher
likelihood to display) particular features. My argu-
ment concerning parental enhancement applies to
embryo choice in a similar way,i but more argument
would be needed to show how, because an embryo
choice is also a case of deciding over the very exist-
ence of a future individual.
This paper does not go as far as concluding
that every kind of parental enhancement is, all
things considered, morally undesirable—the
matter is too complex to settle in a short piece.ii
Even less is the paper about the legal status of
parental genetic shaping. Rather, I have the more
modest aim of explaining why an egalitarian
must ﬁnd some instances of parental enhance-
ment unjust. My focus is on parental enhance-
ments that are not necessary to ensure that the
child has what she is owed by justice and which
do not concern morally mandatory features. Such
enhancements amplify the asymmetry of power
between parents and children without good
reason. Unjust instances of parental enhancement
are, I assume, all-things-considered morally
impermissible.
The argument proceeds from premises (P1–P6)
to intermediary conclusions (C1–C3) to the general
conclusion (C4). In several steps of the argument,
P1 functions as a major premise. In a nutshell, I
argue that:
P1. Children have the same moral status as adults.
C1. Therefore, we ought to seek childrearing
arrangements that embody egalitarian relationships
with children.
P2. Proviso: egalitarian relationships with children
are compatible with asymmetries of power only to
the extent to which the asymmetry is necessary for
(1) advancing the child’s level of advantage up to
what justice requires or (2) instilling in the child
morally required features.
P3. Voluntariness is one aspect of the power dimen-
sion of a relationship. The voluntariness of a rela-
tionship is a function of the voluntariness of
entering it and the voluntariness of exiting it.
C2. Therefore, egalitarian relationships between
parents and children ought to display as much sym-
metry of entry and exit as possible given the proviso.
P4. Parents unavoidably enjoy more voluntariness
with respect to entering the parent–child relation-
ship than children.
P5. The more choice a person has to determine the
identity of her partner in a relationship, the better
positioned that person is to enter that relationship
voluntarily.
P6. Parental enhancement gives prospective parents
some power to determine the identity of their
future children.
C3. Therefore, parental enhancement introduces
inequality of voluntariness in the relationship
between parents and children and is a prima facie
threat to the ideal of an egalitarian relationship
between parents and children.
C4. Therefore, parental enhancement can be justi-
ﬁed only if it is necessary for the child to reach the
level of advantage that she is owed by justice, or if
it is aimed at morally mandatory features.
iAs I argue in Gheaus (Gheaus A. “Parental genetic shaping
and parental environmental shaping”, unpublished
manuscript).
iiFor discussion of various normative aspects of parental
shaping, see refs.1–5
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The rest of the paper defends the premises and explains how
the conclusions follow. Some premises are more obvious than
others.
A ﬁrst example is the ﬁrst, major premise P1: that children
have full moral status, that is the same moral status as adults.
This premise, which I assume is generally undisputed, states the
basic moral equality between children and adults: Its truth is by
no means universally accepted; historically, some philosophers
believed that children and adults do not enjoy basic moral
equality—thus justifying ownership rights of adults over chil-
dren.iii And it is unclear whether contemporary libertarians can
acknowledge children’s full moral status.7 In spite of some his-
torical and possibly contemporary opposition, I assume that the
ﬁrst premise is true. This assumption implies that both kinds of
individuals—children and adults—are being owed duties of
justice and are rights holders. Believing this is compatible with
the possibility that children and adults hold rights on different
bases. Throughout this paper, I assume that children’s rights
protect their interests, rather than their choices—but, import-
antly, one of children’s morally weighty interest is to be allowed
to make choices that are compatible with their level of intellec-
tual and emotional development.8 9 Adults’ rights, by contrast,
can protect both.10 If children and adults have the same moral
status, then children have a moral right to have egalitarian rela-
tionships with adults, including their own parents. Therefore,
(C1) we ought to seek childrearing arrangements that embody
egalitarian relationships with children.
To determine what it means for a relationship with children
to count as egalitarian, I will now defend P2, containing the fol-
lowing proviso: Egalitarian relationships with children are com-
patible with asymmetries of power only to the extent to which
the asymmetry is necessary for (1) advancing the child’s level of
advantage up to what justice requires or (2) instilling in the
child morally mandatory features. Since the second clause (2) is
obvious, I will concentrate on defending the ﬁrst.
Moral equality between children and adults does not mean
that both parties have the same rights, nor do egalitarian rela-
tionships between children and adults require perfect symmetry
of power. Like most,iv I assume that children do not have the
moral authority to make the same choices as adults although, as
they grow up, the scope of their authoritative choices expands,
and they may have moral authority over more choices than
usually assumed by the legal status quo. Children have import-
ant, rights-generating interests that they cannot protect by them-
selves, especially when very young. Therefore, they are entitled
to adult action aimed at protecting these interests. For this
reason, adults have a duty to promote children’s well-being up
to a certain level, and some adults—most obviously, parents—
have the right to make choices on children’s behalf, to the
extent to which these choices are necessary to promote the well-
being owed to children up to a certain level and children’s
moral development. Thus, some asymmetry of power between
children and their parents is legitimate and required by, rather
than undermining, egalitarian. Children, for instance, have a
powerful, rights-generating interest to stay alive and, as long as
they do not have the authority to judge how they can best
ensure that their interest is met, their parents are entitled to
make, for instance, medical decisions on their behalf. Similarly,
children have a powerful, rights-generating interest to develop
into functioning and autonomous adults; for this reason, their
parents have a right to teach them, for instance, the ways of
peaceful social interaction (and demand them to comply). By
contrast, children do not have the authority to either make
medical decisions on behalf of their parents or to discipline
them.
The crucial question, then, is how to identify the threshold
that determines legitimate exercise of parental power—that is,
the exercise of parental power that is compatible with egalitar-
ian relationships between parents and children. Existing legisla-
tions allow parents to exercise their power over children to
confer on to them unlimited advantage as long as the parent is
in otherwise rightful possession of the necessary means. For
instance, parents are allowed to enrol their children in elite,
expensive private boarding schools, whether or not the child is
willing. More generally, parents are legally permitted to exercise
their power over children to decide about virtually every aspect
of the child’s life as long as they respect certain constraints con-
cerning the child’s safety and well-being—that is, as long as they
do not abuse or neglect their children and, in most countries, as
long as they comply with certain demands concerning medical
checks and children’s compulsory education. For instance,
parents may educate their children in their own religion and
forbid them to develop close relationships with atheists or with
members of other religions.
But neither the permission to use parental power to advance
parents’ own interests, nor the permission to use it to confer any
amount of beneﬁt on to the child, can be legitimate. According
to many philosophers, and possibly to common sense morality,
existing legal constraints on the use of parental power fall short
of the moral demands of adequate parenting. Here, I follow a
number of liberal egalitarian theories of justice in childrearing,
according to which legitimate exercise of parental power over
children is indeed very restricted by comparison to what tradition
and common sense morality allows.11 12 Liberals who acknow-
ledge the equal moral status of children and adults must deem
illegitimate uses of parental power that set back one’s child inter-
est and also uses of parental power that are not necessary to
advance a child’s well-being. Take, for instance, a parent’s deci-
sion that her child undergoes very low-risk hormonal treatment
to ensure the child will grow up to a certain height because she—
the parent—would like to have a tall child. Assume this decision
is unlikely to contribute to the child’s well-being: suppose that,
after therapy, the child would become a successful basketball
player and that, in the absence of the therapy, she would become
an equally successful runner. Yet, the parent strongly prefers a
basketball career for her child, and this is the reason to go for
hormonal therapy. In this case, the parental exercise of power
is illegitimate. Egalitarians believe that children are entitled to
their fair share of resources, or (opportunities for) welfare, or
to a certain number of capabilities. If they also think that indi-
viduals are proper agents of justice, they will be committed to
the view that uses of parental power is illegitimate if it is
aimed at giving the child more than her fair share. One of the
usual illustrations of illegitimate use of parental power involves
parents enrolling their children into an elite, expensive private
school to give them competitive advantage, especially if
adequate public education is available.11 13 A common com-
plaint against the parent who chooses hormonal treatment for
her child and against the parent who puts her child into a
private school can be expressed as an objection to illegitimate
use of parental power. Both parental decisions amplify the
asymmetry of power between parents and children without, in
the ﬁrst case, necessarily contributing to the well-being of the
child and, in the second case, without them being necessary to
iiiMost famously, Aristotle.6
ivFor an inﬂuential recent account, see Brighouse and Swift.11
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ensure that the child will reach the level of well-being required
by justice.
All the examples I used so far concern one aspect of the
power relationship between parents and children: parents’ asym-
metrical authority to make decisions concerning children’s lives.
Another element that is relevant to the power aspect of a
human relationship concerns its voluntariness—that is, whether
the relationship has been entered freely and whether the parties
to the relationship are free to dissolve it (P3). If, for instance,
two individuals are in a relationship which one of them can exit
at low cost and the other one at high cost, then the ﬁrst person
has more power over the second person: the ﬁrst person can use
her better exit options to set the conditions of the relationship.
This seems objectionable—as republican political philosophers
insist14—even when the higher level of power conferred by
better exit options is not in fact used to set back the options of
the weaker party. The egalitarian intuition here is that moral
equals should not have unequal exit options because, absent
special justiﬁcation, this inequality seems inconsistent with the
two parties’ equal moral status.
The same can be said about enjoying the same level of volun-
tariness with respect to entering a relationship between equals.
The real importance lies with parties having the same level of
choice, rather than with the parties always making autonomous
choices about entering the relationship. Think for instance,
about the relationship between natural siblings: neither has a
choice of whether or not to enter a relationship with the other
sibling, yet, since they are symmetrically situated in this respect,
sibling relationships seem as such unobjectionable to egalitar-
ians. By contrast, consider the following imaginary case: Alexis
and Eirian are partners in a marriage that is perfectly egalitarian
as far as spouses’ rights and duties are concerned. However,
only one of them, Eirian, has voluntarily decided to enter the
marriage, while the decision that Alexis gets married was made
by Alexis’ family. Unlike the siblings’ case perhaps, it would be
objectionable if both Eirian and Alexis were married off by their
families; but the case just described is particularly objectionable
on egalitarian grounds because the asymmetry of choice at entry
seems, again, inconsistent with the two spouses’ equal moral
status. Other things equal, an egalitarian relationship will
display the same level of voluntariness with respect to entry and
exit for all parties.
But between parents and children things are not equal, as the
above discussion shows. Children have morally weighty inter-
ests, some of which are rights generating and for the fulﬁlment
of which they need to rely on some adults. This justiﬁes parents’
rights to decide for their children and also unequal exit options
for children and parents from their relationship. Most legisla-
tions do not allow children to ‘divorce’ their parents at will; as
long as parents are not abusive or neglectful, a child can usually
exit the relationship with her parent only at pain of becoming
homeless and an outlaw. It is debatable whether we ought to
relax children’s exit options from their relationship with their
parents,v but, in any case, we should acknowledge that in some
situations it is in the child’s best interest to face very high costs
of exiting the relationship. Parents, too, are—for good reason—
unable to dissolve the relationship with their children lightly.15
But, the costs faced by parents are not equally high: it is technic-
ally easy for new birth parents to put their children up for adop-
tion and it is plausible that we ought to allow parents who feel
they cannot parent well (anymore) to step out of their parental
role. Therefore, strictly equal levels of voluntariness with
respect to exit are not an ideal in the parent–child relationship.
Rather, (C2) egalitarian relationships between parents and chil-
dren ought to display as much symmetry of voluntariness on
both sides as possible, given that proviso is satisﬁed.
The relationship between parents and children is asymmetric-
ally voluntary with respect to exit and it is also—in part
unavoidably—asymmetrically voluntary with respect to entry.
We do not choose to be born, nor could we conceivably make
such a choice. Because we come into existence as non-agents, it
is not possible to give a prospective child the option to enter
the relationship with her future parents in a voluntary way. Our
parents, however, have some degree of control with respect to
entering parenthood—and, in places where adequate contracep-
tion and education are available, becoming a parent is a volun-
tary choice. It is likely that the great harm represented by
unwanted pregnancies and childrearing responsibilities means
that this asymmetry of choice between parents and children is
all-things-considered justiﬁed. Whether or not this is so, it is
clear that unlike the asymmetry of exit, the asymmetry of entry
is unavoidable. Therefore, (P4) parents unavoidably enjoy more
voluntariness with respect to entering the parent–child relation-
ship than children.
Yet, how voluntary is entry into a relationship which is
deﬁned by pre-established rights and duties turns on two
factors. One is whether or not a person agrees to enter a type of
relationship (are Alexis and Eirian willing to get married at all?).
The other is whether or not the person has a choice with
respect to the particular individual with whom she is entering
the relationship (are Alexis and Eirian willing to get married to
each other rather than to different eligible partners?). This
means that (P5) the more choice a person has to determine the
identity of her partner in a relationship, the better positioned
that person is to enter that relationship voluntarily.
Traditionally, parents and children have been equals with
respect to how much choice they had in the second respect:
none. However, (P6) parental enhancement gives prospective
parents some power to determine the identity of their future
children.
The next question is whether increased parental choice with
respect to some features of one’s future child poses a prima
facie challenge to the egalitarian nature of the parent–child rela-
tionship. Children cannot be given a similar—or, indeed, any—
power to intentionally inﬂuence the characteristics of their
parents-to-be. It may be the case that embryos effect some
changes on their gestational mother, in uterovi— but these can
only be unintentional inﬂuences. Now remember Alexis and
Eirian, and imagine one variation: that they live in a society
where all marriages are arranged by the family of the spouses.
Imagine, further, that neither Eirian nor Alexis has a choice of
whether or not to marry but Eirian is told about a few differ-
ences between the potential spouses and allowed to decide
which to marry based on this knowledge. Alexis has no similar
choice. If Eirian makes use of this limited available choice, the
egalitarian nature of the future relationship between Eirian and
Alexis is, in one respect, compromised. Yet, you may object that
embryos and newborns are unlike Alexis and Eirian in one
important respect: embryos or newborns do not have any
choice and they are not capable of any choice—let alone
vI argue that we should, in Gheaus.16 viGheaus (see footnote I).
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morally authoritative choice. For this reason, you may think that
the asymmetry of choice in question is entirely irrelevant to
how egalitarian the future parent–child relationship will be. My
rejoinder is that, although embryos and newborns cannot
choose, children can, staring at a very young age. In general and
ideally, a child will be parented by the same person continu-
ously; therefore, the same, entirely unchosen, person will be the
parent even when the child reaches an age when she can make
some morally authoritative choices. At the very latest at that
moment, it will become relevant that the child and the parent
are part of a relationship in which only one party had some
choice over the identity of the other. But, more likely, the fact
that only one party had some choice is morally relevant from
the very beginning, since part of the parental duty is to do what
it takes to bring up an autonomous individual: the child should
one day be able to look back on her life and understand that she
has always been part of a relationship shaped by avoidable asym-
metry of power.vii Therefore, parental enhancement introduces
inequality of voluntariness in the relationship between parents
and children and is a prima facie threat to the ideal of an egali-
tarian relationship between parents and children (C3).
Whether this prima facie threat actually undermines the egalitar-
ian nature of the relationship will depend on the kind of enhance-
ment in question and the parents’ motivation for enhancing. A
decision to determine certain bodily enhancements—like height or
eye colour—meant to merely satisfy parental preferences do
undermine the egalitarian nature of the relationship, since parental
power over the child is not permissibly used merely to advance the
parents’ interests. The same is true about enhancements that
parents choose to give their child advantages above and beyond
what is required by justice, for instance, a superior IQ.
It is not my aim here to defend a particular conception of
what we are owed by justice, neither in terms of the right prin-
ciple (like equality, sufﬁciency or priority) nor in terms of the
right metric (like opportunities for welfare, resources or capabil-
ities). Even less can I specify with any precision which particular
enhancements are necessary to ensure one’s future child will not
fall below the level of advantage that she is owed by justice.
This will depend both on the theoretical choices of principle
and metric mentioned above and on empirical matters. But
some cases seem unproblematic: certain medical enhancements
—for instance, against high likelihood of future disease or dis-
ability—are likely to be necessary to ensure the child will reach
the level of advantage required by justice. This is because we
quite trivially believe that justice requires us to eliminate disease
and disability when we can do this for all affected. Also, the
recently much discussed moral enhancements17 may be
protected by the proviso when they concern features that are
morally required. Note, however, that when an embryo requires
treatment against future disadvantage, or the enhancement of
morally required features, it is better for the enhancement to be
a matter of public, state sponsored decision rather than be left
to the discretion of parents.18 Yet, absent such policies, parental
decision to enhance for this kind of features is compatible with
the egalitarian nature of the parent–child relationship.
Therefore, (C4) parental enhancement can be justiﬁed only if it
is necessary for the child to reach the level of advantage that she
is owed by justice, or if it is aimed at morally mandatory
features.
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